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Abstract
Statisticians have warned us since the early days of their discipline
that experimental correlation between two observations by no means im-
plies the existence of a causal relation. The question about what clues
exist in observational data that could informs us about the existence of
such causal relations is nevertheless more that legitimate. It lies actually
at the root of any scientific endeavor. For decades however the only ac-
cepted method among statisticians to elucidate causal relationships was
the so called Randomized Controlled Trial. Besides this notorious excep-
tion causality questions remained largely taboo for many. One reason for
this state of affairs was the lack of an appropriate mathematical framework
to formulate such questions in an unambiguous way. Fortunately thinks
have changed these last years with the advent of the so called Causality
Revolution initiated by Judea Pearl and coworkers. The aim of this ped-
agogical paper is to present their ideas and methods in a compact and
self-contained fashion with concrete business examples as illustrations.
1 A Stormy Relationship
Consider the following three pairs of concomitant events: “the sun rises shortly
after the first crow of the rooster”, “the number of visit to some website tends
to increase when an ad banner is shown in some appropriate location” and “the
rate of skin cancer parallels the sale of ice creams on the French Riviera”. While
common sense dictates that there is little chance to reduce cancer by limiting
ice cream sales or to speed up sunrise by tickling so it crows earlier, it is not
unlikely though that trying to optimize the position of an ad banner might in-
deed be worth the effort. So it seems our intuition about how the world works
tells us something about this concomitant events which goes beyond what mere
statistics can describe. Statistics indeed only deals with correlation, meaning
it quantifies how likely it is that an event B will occur assuming that we have
observed another event A. It tells us nothing however about what happens if we
act on a system and it even provides no means to describe what an intervention
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on a system is. The conclusion is thus straightforward: in general we need more
than just probability and statistics to express and answer causality questions.
The method of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) which entirely rests
on statistic analysis and is widely recognized as the gold standard for clinical
trial is one noteworthy exception that we shall have more to say about later on.
The innate inability of plain statistics to properly deal with causality in all
its generality has only been recognized at the turn of this century [1]. Before
that, a controversy had been going on for nearly one century. We won’t enter
these lengthy debates because fortunately nowadays there is no reason for con-
troversy anymore! The pioneering work of Judea Pearl [1, 2, 3], a philosopher
and statistician, put a definitive end to these quarrels by providing a mathe-
matically sound framework that allows both to formulate causality questions
in an unambiguous way and to answer them systematically whenever this is
possible [3]. Judea Pearl is largely responsible for a complete reshaping of the
causality debate, which has since then been termed the Causal Revolution.
For this and his other outstanding achievements on causal reasoning in AI he
was awarded the Turing prize in 2011.
Before we dive into the subtleties of Judea Pearl conceptions of causality, let’s
acknowledge that many data scientist who use supervised machine learning
as their everyday tool never bother about causality issues. As a matter of fact
they could could run into serious trouble because of this but it is nevertheless a
legitimate attitude in two common situations that we briefly mention.
• First, it could be that simply learning a correlation between to two type of
events has value in its own right. An image detection system for instance
associates a probability of presence of an object within a picture. The
important point is that any subsequent action driven by such a correlation
based prediction should no retro-act in any way on the measure variables.
• Second, there are other situations where a passive observation of some
feature X has indeed the same effect (on predicting a target variable Y )
as an intervention where we prescribe the value of that feature. Imagine for
instance that X is the rotation speed of an air pump and Y is the pressure
it maintains in a room. Once we have learned the relation between X and
Y by passive observations, we will be able to predict the air pressure
when we set the speed of the pump. Intuitively, the causal relationship
from X to Y is direct and unperturbed. We will precisely characterize
theses situations in section 2.4 when we describe the do Calculus.
Where Judea Pearl’s approach really shines is in less obvious situations where
we would like to infer the effect of setting X = x on the value of Y in the
presence of a whole network of causal relationships that involves other variables
Z. These variables are often called concomitants [4] and may be observed
or not. In its simplest version the root of the difficulty in answering causal
questions is depicted in figure 1 which illustrates the notion of a confounder
Z. In intuitive terms a confounder Z is a variable that could potentially hinder
the identification of a causal relationship between two other variables X and Y
by being a cause of both. An observed change in the value of Y that results
from a change of X could just as well be attributed to a change of Z. Yet, if
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Figure 1: Suppose X designates the choice to administer a medicine to a patient,
Y is the state of health of that patient and Z his or her age. If a doctor chooses to
whom he or she administers the treatment, then the age Z could become a confounder
impacting both the choice X of the treatment and the health state Y .
had access to the values of the confounder Z, we could perhaps adjust for its
effect and thus extract the desired effect of X on Y . The procedure for doing
this, when it is possible, is well known to statisticians and goes under the name
“controlling for Z”. In a nutshell, what Pearl’s machinery achieves is a vast
generalization of this controlling procedure:
Pearl’s graphic and algebraic tools allow the identification of situations in
which we may possibly disambiguate a causal relationship between two vari-
ables X and Y . Wherever this is possible these tools provide explicit formulas
for computing the effect on a variable Y of an intervention that prescribes the
value x of another variable X. These formulas merge two kinds of information.
First, they uses the values of some concomitants Z which are just observed.
Second, they leverage a causal graph G which encapsulates our knowledge of
the causal relationships between the variables within a system of interest.
Later we shall consider still another way to interpret Pearl’s work namely as
a vast generalization of RCT’s.
Pearl’s conceptual and computational tools have several important merits:
• From a practical point of view, they allow to anticipate the effect of an
intervention on a system without actually having to perform any
action on it. This is obviously extremely useful in situations where we
cannot afford to act on a system, whether for ethical or financial reasons.
• Still from a practical point of view, they all to integrate causal prior
knowledge about a system with measurements in a fully consistent man-
ner.
• From conceptual stand point, they provide clear definitions of what is
meant by a causal influence and by an intervention, as we shall see shortly.
This settles the secular causality controversy and reconciles statistics
with causality.
The sequel of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main
concepts and tools defined by Pearl and coworkers. After a brief review of
Bayesian networks which allows us to introduce the notion of d-separation,
we define what a functional causal model is and describe the extent to which
it can be inferred from data. We define the notions of intervention and of
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identifiabiliy. We explain the graphical back-door and front-door criteria
that allow to identify causal effects in some specific circumstances. At last we
introduce the rules of the do-calculus that are even more flexible. Section
3 discusses various business examples as illustrations. The last section offers
some concluding remarks and tries to explain why in our opinion these tools
still remain little known within the data scientist community at large.
2 The Causal Revolution in a Nutshell
In this section we will present the main definitions and mathematical results
underpinning the Causal Revolution. We define what causal relationships
are, how and when we can identify them from data. Then we define what an
intervention is and describe the graphical and algebraic tools which allow to
identify situations where we can compute the consequences of an intervention
using data collected from pure observation. For proofs we refer to Pearl’s book
on Causality [2] and to the original papers [3].
2.1 Bayesian Networks Recap
The tools we shall present in the following subsections rely heavily on a graph-
ical method called the d-separation criterion that allows answering general
independence questions among groups of random variables (r.v). These tools
were pioneered by Pearl who developed the concept of a Bayesian Network.
There are many good textbooks on this topic [9] but we provide a brief intro-
duction both to introduce notations and to make the presentation reasonably
self-contained. Readers familiar with this material are invited to jump to sub-
section 2.2.
We use upper case letters like X,Y or Z to designate r.v. and boldface up-
per case to denote sequences (or sets) of r.v X = (X1, X2, ..., Xm), with lower
indices to denote the components of X. For simplicity we shall assume that
each component takes only a finite number of values. The corresponding re-
alizations of these r.v. will be denoted with corresponding lower case letters
x = (x1, x2, ..., xm).
The first step is to associate a graph G to a probability distribution p(x) =
p(x1, x2, ..., xm). Iterating the product rule for conditional probabilities we have:
p(x) = p(x1, x2, ..., xn) = p(x1) p(x2, ..., xn|x1)
= p(x1) p(x2|x1) p(x3, ..., xn|x1, x2)
= ...
=
n∏
j=1
p(xj |x1, ..., xj−1) (1)
where the conditioning set for j = 1 is empty. Now if Xj is only conditioned
on a subset of X1, ..., Xj−1, let’s denote the minimal such subset by PAj , the
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parents of Xj , so that we can write:
p(x1, x2, ..., xn) =
n∏
j=1
p(xj |paj). (2)
A natural representation of (2) is to use a Bayesian network which is a di-
rected acyclic graph (DAG) where each node of the graph corresponds to a
variable Xj and a directed link points from each member of PAj towards Xj as
figure 2 shows. We say that the probability distribution p and the graph G are
Figure 2: A unique DAG G can be associated to a probability distribution p on an
order set or r.v. X1, ..., Xn.
compatible. Note also that according to (1) the DAG associated to a generic
distribution p with no specific factorization properties is a fully connected graph.
Hence all information in a DAG is really contained it the missing links.
For a given order of the r.v. this graph G is unique. However, if we had
chosen another order for the r.v. in p we would have obtained another graph G′.
Therefore, the natural question that arises is to determine when two DAG G
and G′ observationally equivalent. More precisely we want to ask whether
any probability distribution p which is compatible with G is also compatible
with G′. The following can be shown [2]:
Theorem 1 (observationnal equivalence). Two DAG’s are observationally equiv-
alent if two conditions are met. First the graphs that result from stripping of the
arrows on the edges of G and G′ (their skeletons) should be the same. Second,
G and G′ should have the same ν-structures, which are nodes with converging
arrows whose tails are not connected by an arrow.
Let X,Y and Z be three groups of r.v. whose joint distribution is p. Of
particular interest is the question whether X is independent of Y conditionally
on observing Z, that is whether
p(x,y| z) = p(x|z) p(y|z), (3)
or, equivalently, whether
p(x| y, z) = p(x|z). (4)
When the answer is yes, we denote this by X ⊥ Y |Z. The d-separation theorem
below allows us to answer this question graphically by looking at the graph G
associated to p. For this we need the following graphical concept:
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Definition 1 (d-separation). A path γ in a DAG G (a sequence of consecutive
edges oriented in any direction) is said to be blocked by a set of nodes Z if and
only if one of the following two conditions is met:
1. γ contains a chain i→ m→ j or a fork i← m→ j such that m belongs
to Z.
2. γ contains a collider i → m ← j such that neither m nor any of its
descendants (as defined by the arrows on the edges in G) belongs to Z.
A set Z is said to d-separate X from Y whenever Z blocks every path from a
node in X to a node in Y.
Figure 3: Observed nodes are depicted as filled circles. In (a) the path from X to Y
is neither blocked by Z2, because it is an observed descendant of the collider Z1, nor
is it by Z3 which is an unobserved fork. In (b) the path from X to Y is blocked by Z3
because it is an observed fork.
We can now formulate the d-separation criterion which relate the factoriza-
tion properties of p described by a compatible DAG G and the independence
relationships they imply:
Theorem 2 (d-separation theorem). Let X,Y,Z be three disjoint sets of nodes
in a DAG G compatible with a distribution p. Then the corresponding r.v.
distributed according to p satisfy X ⊥ Y |Z whenever X and Y are d-separated
by Z.
The converse is true as well. An important consequence from theorem 2
is that the set of conditional independence among r.v. is determined by the
topology of G only, while the ordering of the r.v. plays no role. When we
consider the d-separation criterion as a graphical test on the nodes of a DAG G
we shall write (X ⊥ Y | Z)G. Using (4) we can rewrite theorem 2 compactly as
p(x| y, z) = p(x|z) when (X ⊥ Y | Z)G . (5)
We insist that that so far there has been no discussion of causality, only inde-
pendence questions were examined. There is however an easy mnemonic for
the d-separation criterion if we momentarily allow ourselves to associate a causal
meaning to the arrows in G. Indeed, if we fix the value of the middle node m in
a chain or a fork we block the information flow between the two end nodes i and
j which thus become independent. If, on the contrary, we observe the value of
a collider node m, or of some of its descendants, we actually observe a common
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consequence of i and j. Knowing both i and m for example will thus tell us
something about j, which thus opens the information flow. This independence
analysis based on d-separation prefigures the genuine causal analysis we develop
in the next subsections.
2.2 Functional Causal Models and Interventions
Structural Equations
A conditional probability p(y|x) tells us how the probability of seeing Y = y is
affected by having observed that X = x. It tells us nothing however about what
happens when we prescribe the value of X. To answer that question we need
more information than p contains, namely information about how the proba-
bilistic model p will change under an external intervention. This is precisely
what a functional causal model M does. It is defined as a set of functional
relationships which describe how each r.v. Xj is determined as a function of the
others and of some noisy disturbances. It thus explains how the data is gener-
ated. Using the notation PAj to denote the set of r.v. that directly influence
Xj , a causal model is then defined as a set of structural equations:
Xj = fj(PAj , j), j = 1, ..., n, (6)
where the fj ’s are deterministic functions of both the parents variables PAj and
some noisy disturbance j . An important point is that the j should be inde-
pendent. In other words each relation is assumed to be disturbed by a single
random perturbation. If a perturbation were to affect several r.v. simultane-
ously, we should promote it to an unobserved Xj with a structural equation
describing its influence on other variables. A causal graph G can be associated
to a causal model M as shown in figure 4 which also defines the notion of a
confounding arc.
Figure 4: A causal model G where observed r.v. like X,Y or Z are represented as
full circles, while unobserved r.v. like U1 or U2 are represented as empty circles. A
confounding arc is a path which joins two observed r.v., contains only unobserved r.v.
and has no converging arrows.
The probability distribution p on a set of r.v. X is be completely specified
by the model M which comprises the set of deterministic functions fj and the
distributions of the disturbances j . In practice these will however remain un-
specified. Beware that the links in figure 2 represent conditional dependencies
p(xj |paj) while they represent deterministic dependencies xj = fj(paj , j) in
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figure 4.
Assume that we are given a causal graph G associated to causal model M
which generates a probability distribution p. What independence relationships
hold for this p ? The answer is as simple as we could have dreamed: they
are precisely those determined by the d-separation criterion applied to G. This
follows from the fact that p is compatible with G in the Bayesian network sense
and from the d-separation theorem1.
The do-Operator
An intervention on a system described by a causal model is an alteration of
the structural equations (6) where some relationships are replaced by others. In
the simplest case were we fix the value of say Xi to a this amounts to replacing
the equation Xi = fi(PAj , i) with Xi = a. The corresponding causal graph of
the modified model is thus obtained from G by removing all links connecting
the nodes to Xi to their parents PAi as figure 5 shows.
Figure 5: Removing the links between the variable X4 and its parents PA4 to define
an intervention. If (a) represents p(x), then (b) represents p(x|do(x4 = a))
After the intervention, the probability distribution p(x) is replaced by a new
one which we denote by p(x|do(xi = a)). This defines the do-operator. Using
this definition and the factorization (1) for the distribution p we can also express
the post intervention distribution as a truncated factorization:
p(x| do(xi = a)) :=

p(x)
p(xi| pai)
=
∏
j 6=i
p(xj | paj) if xi = a,
0 if xi 6= a.
(7)
In general p(x| do(xi = a)) is of course different from the classical conditional
p(x| xi = a). One trivial case where both expressions are indeed identical is
1To see this note that (6) implies that the joint distribution p(x1, ..., xn, 1, ..., n) on the
original r.v. and on the disturbances is compatible, in the Bayesian network sense, with the
graph G′ constructed from G by adding to it all nodes corresponding to the disturbances
j together with their links directed towards the nodes Xj . The same paths γ in G which
separate some groups of variables in G also separate them in G′. The statement thus directly
follows from the d-separation theorem 2 applied to G′.
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when Xi has no parents (PAi = ∅). The general question of when an action
on a variable X has the same consequence on another variable Y as an obser-
vation will be answered precisely when we present the do-calculus in section 2.4.
To get more intuition about the do-operator let’s compute the effect of an
intervention do(xi = a) on a single variable Y which is different from both Xi
and its parents PAi. Plugging
p(x)
p(xi| pai)
=
p(x)
p(xi,pai)/p(pai)
= p(x|xi,pai) p(pai) (8)
into (7) for xi = a and marginalizing over all variables except on y and on xi
we obtain
p(y| do(xi = a)) =
∑
x\(y∪xi)
p(x| do(xi = a))
=
∑
x\(y∪xi)
p(x|xi = a,pai) p(pai)
=
∑
pai
p(pai)
∑
x\(y∪xi∪pai)
p(x|xi = a,pai)
=
∑
pai
p(pai) p(y|xi = a,pai) (9)
This conditioning and weighting operation (9) on the variables PAi to com-
pute p(y| do(xi = a)) is known as adjusting for the direct causes of Xi.
This wording comes from the fact that the ordinary conditioning p(y|xi) is ob-
tained by simply marginalizing p(y|xi,pai) over pai. The weights p(pai) thus
appear as correcting factors which are necessary for computing the intervention
p(y| do(xi)).
When the parents PAi of a manipulated variable Xi are all measurable then
(7) shows that the effect of an intervention can be computed from passive ob-
servations as these determine p(x) and hence p(xi| pai). In practice though,
we could rather use (9) and determine the prior p(pai) and the conditional
p(y|xi = a,pai) using machine learning for instance.
The interesting question then is whether we can compute the effect of an
intervention when this is not the case, that is when some of the r.v. in PAi are
not measurable? More generally, the question that naturally arises is then the
following. Given a causal graph G and a subset Z of observable concomitants
can we express p(y| do(x = a)) in terms of the distribution on the observed
variables Z, X and Y only? When this is the case we shall say that the causal
effect of X on Y is identifiable. Lets compactly summarize this concept of
identifiability [11].
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Passive observation of the variables X and Y and a group Z observable con-
comitants informs us on their joint distribution p(x, y, z), as long as we have
enough data of course. However, the effect p(y|do(x)) on Y of an intervention
on X is only encoded in the causal model M which generates this p, but not
in p itself! The problem we thus face is that two different causal models M1
and M2 could generate the same p. To predict the effect of an intervention we
thus need more information than is contained in p. The causal graph G asso-
ciated to the causal model M can sometimes provide this missing information,
without the need for a complete knowledge of the causal model M . When this
is the case, we say that the intervention p(y|do(x)) is identifiable from G.
In subsections 2.3 and 2.4 we shall describe graphical and symbolic tools to
answer these questions.
Interpreting Randomized Control Trials with the do-Operator
Lets quickly make contact between the definition (7) of the do operator and the
Randomized Control Trial (RCT) procedure. Consider a situation where
we would like to assess the effectiveness of a treatment on a group of patients.
Say that X = 1 means we apply the treatment and X = 0 we don’t and that Y
represents the resulting impact of their health (“improved”, “stable”, “deterio-
rated”). Patients are characterized by features like Z1 =age, Z2 =gender and
Z3 =“is diabetic” which could also influence their health state.
Figure 6: (a) The causal diagram of the combined impact of the treatment X and the
features Z = (Z1 = age, Z2 = gender, Z3 = “is diabetic”) of a patient on his health Y ,
(b) the causal diagram when the experimenter chooses himself the patients to whom he
administers the treatment, thus potentially transforming Z into confounders, (c) the
treatment is administered by randomly flipping a coin C thus decoupling the treatment
from any potential confounders.
The corresponding causal diagram is shown in figure 6 (a). For this diagram we
would like to compute p(y|do(x)). If the experimenter chooses which patient she
will administer the treatment to, she could inadvertently transform the features
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Z into confounders that will simultaneously impact the decision X to administer
the treatment and the health Y of the patient. This is represented in figure 6
(b). The RCT procedure subordinates the decision to administer the treatment
to the result of flipping a perfect coin C whose outcome is neither influenced
by Z nor has any direct influence on Y . It thus cuts the same incoming links
to the instrumented variable X as those which had to be removed to define
p(y| do(x)) in (7). In such a circumstance p(y|x, c) = p(y|x), because X blocks
the path between C and Y . Therefore (9) implies that p(y| do(x)) = p(y|x). In
other words, when using the RCT procedure observing X has the same effect
on predicting Y as prescribing the value of X.
Can we Infer a Causal Graph from Raw Data?
In sections 2.3 and 2.4 we shall describe tools to answer the identifiability ques-
tion above assuming that we are given a causal graph G and that some of its
variables Z can be measured. But what if we have no causal graph G available
in the first place? Can we infer it directly from data? This is secular question
which has sparked a lot of controversy. In every day life we all use some clues to
identify causal relationship, the most important one being the assumption that
a cause always precedes its effects. Analyzing these temporal aspects of causal-
ity would however quickly drive us into discussing the origin of the asymmetry
between the past and the future and other foundational issues in physics [8]. As
interesting as they are, we will not address these issues here, because this would
take us too far away from our subject of analyzing the patterns of data which
can identity functional causal relations as defined by structural equations (6).
We refer to [1] for a broader panorama of causality.
The common wisdom among statisticians has long been that this identifying
a causal model from data is plain impossible. And, indeed, in general it is impos-
sible as we shall confirm. The interesting point though is that contrary to this
common belief there are practically relevant situations where this identification
of G is possible, at least in part. Again, a thorough discussion of these matters
would be out of the scope for this short paper. We therefore limit ourselves to
summarizing one significant result in [2] which shows that, assuming a specific
interpretation of Occam’s razor, an equivalence class of causal graphs G can be
inferred when all variables X in G are measurable.
So lets assume that the variables X are all measurable and that their proba-
bility distribution is p(x). With no further assumptions there could exist many
different causal graphs compatible with p. Therefore we need to put further
restrictions on the causal models we are trying to infer. We shall indeed put
two such restrictions. The first, minimality, conforms with standard scientific
practice and restricts our search to the simplest possible causal graphs G only,
the second, stability, will be a condition on the causal model M itself:
1. We say that a graph G1 is preferable to another graph G2 whenever
any probability distribution p compatible with G1 is also compatible with
G2. In other words, G2 is more expressive than G1. Among all graphs
compatible with p we shall look for a minimal graph, that is one which
is preferable to all others in that set [2].
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2. Given causal model M which generates a distribution p compatible with
a DAG G, we have to make sure that p has no accidental independence
relationships. More formally, if θ are the values of the parameters of
the causal model M which defines p through (6), we demand that no
independence relationships satisfied by p (which can be read-off from G)
gets destroyed when we change θ to some other value θ′. When this holds
we say that the causal model generates a stable distribution [2].
Theorem 1 on observational equivalence then implies the following:
Theorem 3. If a distribution p is generated by a stable causal model M then,
up to observational equivalence, there is a unique minimal causal graph G com-
patible with p.
A class of observationally equivalent graphs can be represent graphically by a
representation called a pattern [2]. A pattern is a partially directed DAG where
some edges are directed while others are not. The directed ones correspond to
edges that are common to all members of the pattern, while the undirected
one could be oriented in either direction. Pearl and Verma [6, 7] developed
an algorithm, the IC algorithm (for Inferred Causality) which constructs the
pattern associated to any stable distribution p on a set of observable variables.
We refer to [2] for a detailed description of the IC algorithm and for various
extensions of IC to causal models with latent variables. Other interesting results
obtained by Pearl pertain to the falsifiability of some assumptions in a causal
graph [12, 13].
2.3 Answering Causality Questions with Graphs
As we have seen earlier, the causal effect p(y|do(x) is identifiable as soon as the
parents PA(X) of the cause X are measurable. Formula (9) answers the question
by showing how we should adjust the conditionals p(y|x, pa) according to the
prior probabilities p(pa) of the direct causes. In this subsection we describe two
simple graphical criteria which answer the question in more general cases.
The Back-Door Criterion
The following holds [2, 3]:
Theorem 4. The effect p(y|do(x)) on Y of an intervention on X is identifiable
from the causal graph G when a group Z of observable r.v. satisfy the following
two conditions:
1. No variable Zi is a descendant of X in G. In other words X should have
no influence on any of the variables in Z.
2. The group of variables Z should block any path γ between X and Y in G
that has an incoming arrow into X (back-door paths).
When both conditions are verified we have the reduction:
p(y|do(x)) =
∑
z
p(y|x, z) p(z) (10)
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The above reduction formula can be considered as a generalization of the
basic adjustment formula (9). Both conditions in theorem 4 can be easily tested
systematically. Various sets Z can be tried to optimize the cost of their mea-
surement.
Figure 7: An example of a group of r.v. Z = (Z3, Z4) that make the intervention of X
on Y identifiable. Indeed Z3 is a measured chain that blocks γ1 and γ2 while Z4 blocks
γ3 as a measured chain and γ4 as a measured fork. On the other hand Z
′ = (Z4) does
not because the path γ2 remains unblocked by Z4 which is a measured collider.
Figure 7 gives an example of a group Z = (Z3, Z4) which makes the causal
influence of X on Y identifiable while Z′ = (Z4) does not.
The Front-Door Criterion
Condition 1 in theorem 4 requires that the cause X should not affect the ob-
servable variables Z. Fortunately, another criterion, namely the Front-Door
criterion allows us to prove that the effect of X on Y is nevertheless identifiable
in other some cases. Consider the situation depicted in figure 8 obtained by
amalgamating Z1 to Z5 in figure 7 into a group U which we assume to be unob-
served then renaming Z6 as Z and denoting Z = (Z). This variable Z is under
direct influence of X and does not block the path X → U → Y . Therefore Z
meet neither of the two back-door criteria.
Figure 8: A causal graph which satisfies the conditions for applying the front-door
criterion.
Note that the following three conditions hold in the example of figure 8:
1. The variables Z block the directed path from X to Y .
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2. All back-door paths from X to Z are blocked. Indeed in the example the
path X ← U→ Y ← Z is blocked at Y which is an unconditioned collider.
3. All back-door paths from Z to Y are blocked by X. Indeed in the example
the path Z← X ← U→ Y is blocked by X which is a conditioned chain.
When these three conditions are met we say that the variables Z satisfie the
frond-door criterion relative to the causal effect of X on Y . The following
then holds:
Theorem 5. When the variables Z satisfy the front-door criterion for the effect
of a variable X on a variable Y , then this effect is identifiable and is given by
p(y| do(x)) =
∑
z
p(z|x)
∑
x′
p(y|x′, z) p(x′). (11)
Notice that the variables u do not appear in the above reduction formula
as should be the case for unmeasured variables. This second graphical tool
thus complements our arsenal for discovering identifiable causal graphs. We
will prove it in subsection 2.4 as an example application of the do calculus.
2.4 Answering Causality Questions with the Do-Calculus
Graphical tools are nice because they allow us to identify causal relationships
without having to do any math. Unfortunately, this is not always possible. In
this subsection we present three simple algebraic rules [3] that can be combined
to transform expressions containing both ordinary conditioning .|x and inter-
ventions .|do(x) into equivalent expressions. These rules are the rule of the
do Calculus. Our goal of course is to find an appropriate sequence of these
transformation to eventually get rid of all .|do(x) in order to prove that an in-
tervention is identifiable.
Assume we are given four disjoint subsets of variables X,Y,Z and W in a
causal graph G. Let us denote by GX and GX the graphs obtained from G by
respectively deleting the links incoming into X and outgoing from X. To rep-
resent simultaneous removal of incoming and outgoing links we use a notation
like GXZ. At last, Z(W) will denote the set of Z-nodes which are not ancestors
of any W -nodes in GX.
In the 3 rules below, X always enters as a do(X) intervention, while W occurs
as a passive observation and Y as the consequences we would like to predict.
We also define a mixed conditional probability on Y given an intervention on
X and an observation of W:
p(y| do(x),w) := p(y,w| do(x))
p(w| do(x)) . (12)
Theorem 6. (do Calculus rules)
The following holds:
• Rule 1 [removing an observation]
p(y|do(x), z,w)) = p(y|do(x),w)) when (Y ⊥ Z|X,W)GX .
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• Rule 2 [removing an intervention]
p(y|do(x),do(z),w)) = p(y|do(x),w)) when (Y ⊥ Z|X,W)G
X,Z(W)
.
• Rule 3 [replacing an intervention with an observation]
p(y|do(x),do(z),w)) = p(y|do(x), z,w)) when (Y ⊥ Z|X,W)GXZ .
These rules generalize the basic d-separation rule (5) which recall here for
comparison:
p(y| z,w) = p(y|w) when (Y ⊥ Z |W)G . (13)
In fact (13) is a special case of rule 1 when X = ∅. In the other way around, we
can easily understand rule 1 as a consequence of (13) when we remember that
an intervention do(x) simply removes from G all links entering into X. What
results is precisely the graph GX used in rule 1. Rules 2 and 3 use sub-graphs
of GX. Rule 3 answers the important question of whether an intervention on
the variable Z has the same effect as its passive observation. The simplest
case where rule 3 applies is when G is the two-node graph Z → Y, describing
a direct causal effect, for which GZ reduces to two disconnected nodes thus
trivially ensuring Z ⊥ Y.
An Example - Deriving the Front-Door formula
As an example of an application of the do Calculus let’s see how we can use
them to derive the front door rule (11), referring to figure 9 for the various
subgraphs that we shall need to examine.
Figure 9: The original graph G considered in the front-door rule and the subgraphs
used for its derivation.
Lets go through this step by step following [3].
• First, using the sum rule and definition (12), the desired quantity can be
written as:
p(y| do(x)) =
∑
z
p(y, z| do(x)) =
∑
z
p(y| z,do(x)) p(z| do(x)). (14)
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• Now we can apply rule 3 to remove the do operator on x in the second
factor of (14) to write
p(z| do(x)) = p(z|x) (15)
because (Z ⊥ X)GX as Y is an unconditionned collider in GX.
• Lets now focus on the factor p(y| z,do(x)) in (14). Using rule 3 again
on GXZ which satisfies (Y ⊥ Z|X)GXZ , because there is no path at all
between Y and Z in GXZ, we can replace z by do(z)
p(y| z,do(x)) = p(y| do(z),do(x)). (16)
• Rule 2 now allows deleting the do(x) action from the right member of (16)
because (Y ⊥ X| Z)GXZ , therefore
p(y| do(z),do(x)) = p(y| do(z)). (17)
• Lets thus compute p(y| do(z)). Apply definition (12) on mixed condition-
ing and marginalizing over x
p(y| do(z)) =
∑
x
p(y,x| do(z)) =
∑
x
p(y|x,do(z)) p(x|do(z)). (18)
We can apply rule 2 which implies p(x|do(z)) = p(x) because (X ⊥ Z)GZ ,
the path between X and Z being blocked by Y which is an unconditionned
collider. We can also apply rule 3 which implies p(y|x,do(z)) = p(y|x, z)
because (Y ⊥ Z|X)GZ because X is an observed fork which blocks the
path between Y and Z. Altogether (18) and these last two results imply
p(y| do(z)) =
∑
x′
p(y|x′, z) p(x′). (19)
Combining (16), (17) and (19), we get
p(y| z,do(x)) =
∑
x′
p(y|x′, z) p(x′). (20)
• Eventually, combining (14), (15) and (20), we get the desired result
p(y| do(x)) =
∑
z
p(z|x)
∑
x′
p(y|x′, z) p(x′). (21)
which is the same as the front door rule (11).
As this example shows, the do Calculus allows for elegant derivations of identi-
fiability cases but by no means is it obvious! On the contrary, it requires a fair
amount of intuition and practice.
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Strengths and Limitations of the Do Calculus
The rules of the do Calculus have been shown to be complete [10] in the
sense that, if an intervention is identifiable at all, then there exists indeed a
sequence of these 3 rules that will produce an expression free of any do operator.
Unfortunately, there is no general rule for deciding whether an expression is
identifiable or not [2]. In fact one the main difficulty in applying the do calculus
is that there is no general guiding principle that tells us which rule to apply at
each step. Luckily, courageous people have been compiling both identifiable and
non identifiable causal diagrams that we can reuse. Figure 10 shows examples
which are identifiable.
Figure 10: Examples of simple causal graphs where the effect of X on Y is identifiable.
All graphs are maximal.
One important remark is that we can generate many more identifiable diagrams
from these as soon as we realize the following two facts:
Figure 11: Examples of simple causal graphs where the effect of X on Y is not
identifiable.
• Adding an edge to any causal diagram G can only decrease the chances
that the new graph will be identifiable. This is a direct consequence of the
fact that all rules we have been discussing, whether graphical or algebraic,
ultimately amount to testing whether some paths within subsets of G are
blocked. Adding an edge obviously increases the number of paths to test
and thus decreases the chances that they will all be blocked.
• Adding an observed variable on an edge of a graph has the opposite
effect. It can only increase the chances that the new graph will be iden-
tifiable because it adds an observed chain which is an additional blocking
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point that can only enhance the chances of d-separation between groups
or variables.
All diagrams shown in figure 10 are maximal in the sense that adding a single
edge to any of them will destroy their identifiability. They are thus the most
useful graph to list. Figure 11 shows examples which are not identifiable.
3 Causal Analysis of Simple Business Examples
Examples of causal analysis are often drawn from fields like agronomy, social
sciences or economics which rely on complex causal models. We rather chose
to illustrate how causal analysis naturally occurs in even the most common
business examples.
3.1 Assessing the Effectiveness of a Loyalty Campaign
The level of satisfaction of customers with a service can often be judged from
their observable behavior such as the number of visits to a website or the time
spent for using that service. This information can help the service provider to
identify early signs that some customers intend to leave the service. Market-
ing can then decide to launch a loyalty campaign that aims at retaining the
customers whose faith wavers. These campaigns of course have a cost and its
therefore important to be able to assess their effectiveness. Does a loyalty cam-
paign of a certain type really have an impact on the attrition rate?
To answer this question let’s formalize the problem. First, let U be a binary
variable that corresponds to the intention of the customer to leave the service
or not, before being targeted by any loyalty campaign. This, of course, will
be an unmeasured variable. This initial intention U certainly has an impact
on the behavior of the customer that can be measured, let’s call this Z. This
behavior Z will determine in turn the decision by the service provider whether
this customer should be targeted by a loyalty campaign. Let’s call this decision
X. Eventually, the final decision of the customer to cancel the service is again
a binary variable, call it Y . This final decision of the customer is certainly
dependent both on his initial intention U and whether he has been targeted or
not by the campaign (X). So, formally, our question translates as : can we
identify the causal impact of being target X on the final decision Y when we
measure Z ? Figure 12 shows the corresponding causal diagram.
Figure 12: The causal model of the impact of a loyalty campaign on the churn rate.
This diagram is nothing but the diagram (c) from the list of identifiable diagrams
in figure 10 with the direct link from Z to Y removed. Therefore it is identifiable.
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On the other hand Z satisfies the two condition of the back-door criterion in
theorem 4. It is not a descendant of X and it blocks the back-door path between
X and Y because it is an observed chain. Thus (10) gives the explicit reduction
of the causal impact of X on Y into observable quantities.
3.2 Claim Provisioning by an Insurance Company
When a claim is reported by an insured, an insurer usually sets aside a cer-
tain amount. This is especially true when personal injury is reported. The
final compensation will obviously depend on the extent of the damage. But, as
insurers have become aware, this compensation will also depend on the initial
provisioning. The aim of causal analysis here is to determine the impact of this
provisioning on the final compensation granted to the insured.
Let U be the complete claim characterization. Its value is unknown at the
time of reporting but it will determine both the declaration Z by the insured and
the final compensation Y granted after investigations. The initial evaluation Z
is what directly determines the expert’s provisioning X which in turns impacts
the final compensation Y . The causal graph is thus exactly the same as in figure
12 and, as a consequence, the same back-door reduction formula (10) applies
here as well.
3.3 Impact of Sales Force Training on Turnover
To improve the efficiency of its sales teams, a company can invest in their
training. This has an easily measurable cost X which it is hoped will help to
increase the turnover Y by increasing sales. As such, the causal relationship
would be direct and thus trivially identifiable. However there is at least one
unmeasured confounding variable which spoils this identifiability, namely the
competitive pressure U . Indeed a strong competitive pressure U will encourage
investment X in a training effort but, simultaneously, it will also impact the
turnover Y . Fortunately though, we can restore identifiability if we can find a
measurable “deconfounding” variable Z within the causal chain from X to Y .
The skills and motivation of salespeople induced by these training and measured
by surveys or polls could play this role. The causal graph is depicted in figure 13,
it is the same as in figure 8 which was the basic graph for which the front-door
rule applies. We can thus use the front-door reduction formula (11).
Figure 13: Causal graph for the impact of a training investment on the turnover
leveraging an evaluation of the skills and motivation of salespeople.
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3.4 Impact of Pricing on Sales
The turnover Y for a company on a product is a function of the price X of the
item and its sales volume Z. For instance Y could be proportional to X ·Z. Now
the price X impacts both the turnover Y but also the sales volume Z, because
lower prices generally increasing the volume. As such, the corresponding causal
graph would be identifiable because it corresponds to graph (b) from in the list
of identifiable graphs from figure 10 with the confounding link between Y and
Z removed. Unfortunately the competition pressure U which is an unknown
variables is a confounder which impacts both the price X and the sales volume
Z rendering the graph shown in figure 14 unidentifiable as it is the same as the
graph (c) in the list of unidentifiable graphs in figure 11.
Figure 14: The impact of pricing on turnover is unidentifiable because of the compe-
tition pressure.
4 Stuff Worth Knowing for Data Scientists?
Once one fully grasps the importance of the paradigm shift implied by the Causal
Revolution, a question will occur to many newcomers. Why hasn’t anyone ever
told me about this while I as learning statistics, probability or machine learning?
How come as a data scientist I’ve never heard of the do Calculus? Is it really
useful in practice? In what area? There are probably several answers to this.
We list some of them below.
• The first reason we see is of cultural nature. This has been well analyzed
in [5] for instance. In reality the word “causality” has long remained
almost taboo in the statistical community which remained faithful to the
classical associationist point of view of the founders of the discipline in
the last century like Pearson and Fisher. They considered that there can
be no evidence about causation within data (except for RCT). It took all
the perseverance and scientific stature of Judea Pearl to reverse people’s
minds on the relationship between causality and statistics. Apparently,
this paradigm shift has yet to infuse the newer data science community at
large.
• The graphical and algebraic machinery we presented in section 2 obvi-
ously only makes sense when the causal graph G is non trivial. This
explains why fields like social sciences, economics, medicine or agronomy,
which have all developed a rich set of causal models, have benefited most
from this renewed perspective on causality. For an elementary causal re-
lationship like G = X → Y there is however no difference between the
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passive observation of the cause X and an intervention on it. Many use
cases worked out by data scientist fall into this category, perhaps in some
cases just by chance. But without such luck, neglecting the difference be-
tween observation and intervention could lead to predictions errors. We
presented a number of examples of such cases in section 3.
• While the graphical rules are rather accessible, the judicious application
of the do Calculus to new causal diagrams undoubtedly requires skill and
intuition. As was suggested in [5], the do Calculus could certainly benefit
from a cookbook for those who cannot afford here to become experts.
• One last reason, a more subjective one, has to do with Pearl’s writing
style [2] which, at times lacks perhaps a bit of conciseness. This can
certainly discourage many readers, even those those who have all prereq-
uisites in statistics and probability theory. The sheer number of historical
anecdotes, examples and comments that Pearl gratifies his readers with
sometimes runs counter to a clear presentation of the key mathematical
facts. The Causality Revolution probably still lacks a concise textbook
like presentation of the subject.
The founding fathers of statistics were certainly right when they insisted
that, in general, we cannot infer causal relations from mere data. But in the
enthusiasm of their nascent discipline, many of their disciples and epigones have
somehow become overzealous. They neglected that in most cases we have more
information available than just data! We have some prior knowledge of how
the world works! Perhaps not a full-fledged causal model, but at least a partial
causal graph. What Pearl tells us is that in some favorable conditions (that we
discussed in section 2), we can merge those two pieces of knowledge in order
to predict the effect of an intervention on a system. If it turns out that these
predictions do not match observations, we just have to work harder and think of
some better model. But, in any case, we have to give up the hope of automating
the discovery of how the world works from observation only. Nature won’t reveal
its charms in front of some dumb algorithm. She is a demanding mistress and
expects us to engage in a thoughtful conversation with her, as curious and
creative minds. So, let’s rejoice, because this is why science is so much fun!
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